Live registry view · as of 2026-08-23
Living repository

Expectations about the Russia's war on Ukraine

“+” indicates that the war is expected to continue in that year, while “−” indicates that the war is expected to end.

Useful?
scroll for all years →
Expected war duration20222023202420252026'E2027'F2028'F2029'F2030'F2031'F2032'F2033'F2034'F2035'F
IMF Country Report (July 2026), baseline
as of 2026-07
IMF Country Report (July 2026), downside
as of 2026-07
EBRD REP (June 2026)
as of 2026-06
KSE Macro Handbook (July 2026)
as of 2026-07
Dragon Capital, CES survey (August 2026), ceasefire
as of 2026-08
Dragon Capital, CES survey (August 2026), war
as of 2026-08
Concorde Capital, CES survey (August 2026)
as of 2026-08

Every cell is queried by row ID from the data registry. Click a value to see its provenance (publisher, document, vintage, primary source).

Need more data?
Download the full outlooks:Useful?
or
From the primary sources — verbatim

“The war remains intense, with rising damages that impact Ukraine's economic capacit . The humanitarian situation remains severe, with millions of refugees and internally displaced people unable to return home. Despite a three-day ceasefire in May, peace talks have made little progress and international efforts to bring about a peace agreement appear to have slowed down amidst other global crises.”

International Monetary Fund — Ukraine: Country Report (EFF programme reviews), p.48 · vintage 2026-07 · UA-Q-0030✓ substring-verified

“The downside scenario continues to be based on a security situation that gradually transitions to a frozen conflict by end-2028 (Annex V).”

International Monetary Fund — Ukraine: Country Report (EFF programme reviews), p.22 · vintage 2026-07 · UA-Q-0023✓ substring-verified

“Externally, peace efforts are slow-going and the war in the Middle East has constrained the availability of critical equipment and other resources needed to protect Ukraine's infrastructure. While frontline positions have remained broadly unchanged, sustained air attacks have caused significant damage, adding pressure on the energy sector and eroding fiscal buffers. Attacks on critical infrastructure over the winter have also taken a heavy social toll.”

International Monetary Fund — Ukraine: Country Report (EFF programme reviews), p.12 · vintage 2026-07 · UA-Q-0031✓ substring-verified

“With the baseline continuing to assume that the war ends this year, revisions to the outlook for subsequent years are limited.”

International Monetary Fund — Ukraine: Country Report (EFF programme reviews), p.19 · vintage 2026-07 · UA-Q-0022✓ substring-verified

“The course of the full-scale war remains the key risk to inflation trends and economic development; however, further developments in the Middle East could also have a significant impact The war is continuing.”

National Bank of Ukraine — Inflation Report, p.5 · vintage 2026-07 · UA-Q-0024✓ substring-verified

“We have revised our assumption for the end of the full-scale war from late 2026 to the second half of 2027. Although the path to a ceasefire and lasting peace remains highly uncertain and could accelerate under favorable military, economic, or diplomatic developments, we consider a longer conflict the more likely outcome. Russia appears prepared to sustain the war despite mounting economic and military pressures, and even if its position continues to deteriorate, negotiations toward a durable peace agreement are likely to take considerable time. Updating this assumption is not intended to signal inevitability, but to provide partners with a realistic basis for assessing Ukraine's medium-term outlook and support needs.”

KSE Institute (Kyiv School of Economics) — Ukraine Macroeconomic Handbook, p.3 · vintage 2026-07 · UA-Q-0028✓ substring-verified

“Growth is projected at 2.2 per cent in 2026, rising to 4.0 per cent in 2027 if the war can be brought to a halt and if post-war reconstruction begins.”

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development — Regional Economic Prospects, p.44 · vintage 2026-06 · UA-Q-0029✓ substring-verified

“The outlook is particularly uncertain largely due to factors outside of Ukraine's control, where a worsened security situation could further damage infrastructure and deepen labour shortages. Conversely, faster-than-expected repairs and diversification of energy infrastructure could alleviate the drag on industrial output and private consumption.”

European Commission — European Economic Forecast, p.182 · vintage 2026-05 · UA-Q-0011✓ substring-verified
Prediction markets

Want to know what prediction markets are saying?

Useful?
Live embeds from Metaculus and Polymarket, plus Kalshi & Manifold figures refreshed daily at 06:00 Kyiv time. · Last updated: 8/23/2026, 3:00:01 AM
Russia's war on Ukraine — Prediction-market snapshot
Source: Metaculus, Polymarket, Kalshi, Manifold · Compiled by Balgove Innovations LTD · 8/23/2026, 3:00:01 AM
Metaculus
Metaculus
When will there be a bilateral ceasefire or peace agreement in the Russia's war on Ukraine?
Metaculus · When will there be a bilateral ceasefire or peace agreement?
https://www.metaculus.com/questions/18546/
Metaculus
Metaculus
Will there be a bilateral ceasefire in the Russia's war on Ukraine before 2027?
Metaculus · Will there be a bilateral ceasefire before 2027?
https://www.metaculus.com/questions/41138/
Polymarket
POLYMARKET
Ukraine signs peace deal with Russia before 2027?
13.5%
YES probability · $2,582,370 traded
polymarket.com/event/ukraine-signs-peace-deal-with-russia-before-2027
Polymarket
POLYMARKET
Will Ukraine agree to cede territory to Russia before 2027?
6.5%
YES probability · $699,692 traded
polymarket.com/event/will-ukraine-agree-to-cede-territory-to-russia-before-2027
Polymarket
POLYMARKET
Will Russia capture all of Donetsk Oblast by December 31, 2026?
2.9%
YES probability · $213,608 traded
polymarket.com/event/will-russia-capture-all-of-donetsk-oblast-by
Polymarket
POLYMARKET
Russia-Ukraine peace talks by December 31, 2026?
50.5%
YES probability · $175,648 traded
polymarket.com/event/russia-x-ukraine-peace-talks-byptptpt-20260609012540716
Additional sources — refreshed daily
Kalshi & Manifold
SourceQuestionThresholdProbabilityVolume / Traders
KalshiWill Zelensky and Putin speak?Before 20276.8%
390,069.98
contracts (public API)
Before Jan 20, 202935%
ManifoldWhen will there be a ceasefire in Ukraine?Before 2027-01-0115.4%188 traders
Before 2027-07-0139.6%
Before 2028-01-0154.8%

Want to know how the IMF’s assumed war end-date was changing in 2022–2025?

Useful?

Across ten IMF Country-Report vintages the assumed wind-down drifted out by about three years — from a 2022 de-escalation to a late-2025 end — yet all those target dates are already behind us while fighting continues.

202220232024202520262027Mar '22Mar '23Jul '23Dec '23Mar '24Jun '24Oct '24Dec '24Mar '25Jun '25Today (mid-2026): every plotted target is already in the pastduring 2022first half 2024mid-2024end-2024last quarter 2025Assumed wind-down yearIMF Country-Report vintage
Step at each new Country-Report vintage (10 reviews, Mar 2022 – Jun 2025). Y-axis encoded from the verbatim baseline phrase in each report: during 2022 → 2022.5, first half 2024 → 2024.25, mid-2024 → 2024.5, end-2024 → 2024.95, last quarter 2025 → 2025.875.
  • March 2022 (RFI): the baseline assumed the war would de-escalate over the course of that year.
  • Through 2023–24 the assumed end stepped forward in stages — first half of 2024, then mid-2024, then end-2024, where it held for three successive reviews.
  • From October 2024 the baseline assumed a wind-down in the last quarter of 2025, repeated through the 5th–8th reviews.
  • Each plotted assumption now lies in the past (the marker line is mid-2026) while the war continues.