| General government balance*, % of GDP | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026'E | 2027'F | 2028'F | 2029'F | 2030'F | 2031'F | 2032'F | 2033'F | 2034'F | 2035'F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMF Country Report (July 2026), baseline as of 2026-07 | ||||||||||||||
| IMF Country Report (July 2026), downside as of 2026-07 | ||||||||||||||
| WB MPO (April 2026) as of 2026-04 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | ||||||
| EC Economic Forecast (May 2026) as of 2026-05 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | ||||||
| NBU Inflation Report (July 2026) as of 2026-07 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | |||||||
| KSE Macro Handbook (July 2026) as of 2026-07 | — | — | — | — | — | — | ||||||||
| ICU Macro Insight (June 2026) as of 2026-06 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | |||||
| Dragon Capital, CES survey (August 2026), ceasefire as of 2026-08 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | |
| Dragon Capital, CES survey (August 2026), war as of 2026-08 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross government debt*, % of GDP | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026'E | 2027'F | 2028'F | 2029'F | 2030'F | 2031'F | 2032'F | 2033'F | 2034'F | 2035'F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMF Country Report (July 2026), baseline as of 2026-07 | ||||||||||||||
| IMF Country Report (July 2026), downside as of 2026-07 | ||||||||||||||
| WB MPO (April 2026) as of 2026-04 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | ||||||
| EC Economic Forecast (May 2026) as of 2026-05 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | ||||||
| KSE Macro Handbook (July 2026) as of 2026-07 | — | — | — | — | — | — | ||||||||
| ICU Macro Insight (June 2026) as of 2026-06 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Every cell is queried by row ID from the data registry. Click a value to see its provenance (publisher, document, vintage, primary source).
“Higher defense and security expenditures (+USD 68.0 billion over 2026-2029), weaker tax revenues, and postponed access to market financing will raise the cumulative budget deficit (excluding grants) to USD 176.3 billion and create a financing gap of USD 67.4 billion, in stark contrast to the negligible gap projected in the Q2 forecast.”
KSE Institute (Kyiv School of Economics) — Ukraine Macroeconomic Handbook, p.4 · vintage 2026-08 · UA-Q-0040✓ substring-verified
“Fiscal deficits excluding budget support grants have remained at around 20- 25 percent of GDP as rising tax revenues tracked large defense expenditure needs.”
International Monetary Fund — Ukraine: Country Report (EFF programme reviews), p.13 · vintage 2026-07 · UA-Q-0038✓ substring-verified
“Since June 2026, Ukraine has been receiving disbursements under the Ukraine Support Loan (USL) program. In July, the IMF Executive Board approved the first review of the four-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program. Taking these and other sources of financing into account, the total amount of direct budget support from international partners in 2026 could reach approximately USD 54 billion. These financing volumes will be sufficient to cover the budget deficit.”
National Bank of Ukraine — Inflation Report, p.4 · vintage 2026-07 · UA-Q-0055✓ substring-verified
“The Supplementary Budget and USL disbursements have been integrated into the baseline, bringing the projected overall deficit excluding budget support grants to UAH 2,148 billion or 21 percent of GDP (about 13⁄4 pp of GDP higher than at program approval).”
International Monetary Fund — Ukraine: Country Report (EFF programme reviews), p.19 · vintage 2026-07 · UA-Q-0056✓ substring-verified
“The treatment of USL as a grant led to a downward revision of the public debt trajectory, now peaking at 111.8 percent of GDP in 2026 under the pre-restructuring baseline.”
International Monetary Fund — Ukraine: Country Report (EFF programme reviews), p.42 · vintage 2026-07 · UA-Q-0057✓ substring-verified
“In 2027, the deficit is expected to decrease to 9.2% of GDP, supported by increased tax collection and a gradual moderation in defence spending.”
European Commission — European Economic Forecast, p.183 · vintage 2026-05 · UA-Q-0041✓ substring-verified
Comparison of institutional forecast accuracy by Average error, Mean absolute error (MAE) and Adjusted MAE. Institutions are ranked by Adjusted MAE — the lowest value indicates the strongest predictive power and is highlighted.
| Institution | N | Avg. error (pp of GDP) | MAE (pp of GDP) | Adj. MAE (pp of GDP) | Rank Avg | Rank MAE | Rank Adj. MAE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ECbest · Adj. MAE | 9 | +3.23 | 4.57 | 5.10 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| KSE | 4 | +3.58 | 3.58 | 5.76 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| NBU | 24 | +7.26 | 7.67 | 6.88 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| IMF | 21 | +7.83 | 8.70 | 8.49 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| ICU | 15 | +9.66 | 13.79 | 14.45 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Institution | N | Avg. error (pp of GDP) | MAE (pp of GDP) | Adj. MAE (pp of GDP) | Rank Avg | Rank MAE | Rank Adj. MAE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ICUbest · Adj. MAE | 15 | -3.05 | 8.49 | 8.94 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| EC | 9 | -2.70 | 7.90 | 9.41 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| IMF | 24 | -12.14 | 18.43 | 17.58 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
Forecasts made long before the actual data are released are inherently harder than those made shortly before release. The Adjusted MAE therefore takes into account the period of time between the making of each forecast and the release of the actual data, putting institutions that forecast at different horizons on an equal footing. The approach follows Michael K. Andersson, Ted Aranki and André Reslow: “Adjusting for Information Content when Comparing Forecast Performance” (2016) and “Evaluation of the Riksbank’s forecast” (2018).