| Current account balance, % of GDP | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026'E | 2027'F | 2028'F | 2029'F | 2030'F | 2031'F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMF WEO (April 2026) as of 2026-04 | ||||||||||
| OECD Economic Outlook (June 2026) as of 2026-06 | — | — | — | — |
| Exports volume growth, y-o-y | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026'E | 2027'F | 2028'F | 2029'F | 2030'F | 2031'F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMF WEO (April 2026) as of 2026-04 | ||||||||||
| OECD Economic Outlook (June 2026) as of 2026-06 | — | — | — | — |
| Imports volume growth, y-o-y | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026'E | 2027'F | 2028'F | 2029'F | 2030'F | 2031'F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMF WEO (April 2026) as of 2026-04 | ||||||||||
| OECD Economic Outlook (June 2026) as of 2026-06 | — | — | — | — |
| EUR/USD rate (USD per EUR, implied by IMF WEO) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026'E | 2027'F | 2028'F | 2029'F | 2030'F | 2031'F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMF WEO (April 2026) as of 2026-04 | ||||||||||
| MKT Market data (August 2026), Dec 2026 futures * as of 2026-08 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | |
| MKT Market data (August 2026), Dec 2027 futures * as of 2026-08 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Every cell is queried by row ID from the data registry. Click a value to see its provenance (publisher, document, vintage, primary source).
“The identified policy gaps primarily reflect the more expansionary fiscal policy in the US relative to the rest of the world (resulting in -0.5 percent of GDP contribution to the imbalance from the fiscal policy gap).”
International Monetary Fund — United States: Article IV Consultation — Staff Report, p.68 · vintage 2026-04 · US-Q-0108✓ substring-verified
“Contrary to expectations, the increase in tariffs was not accompanied by an appreciation of the U.S. dollar. After appreciating by around 6 percent in the last three months of 2024, the dollar unwound these gains in 2025H1, ending the year down 7 percent relative to end-2024.”
International Monetary Fund — United States: Article IV Consultation — Staff Report, p.18 · vintage 2026-04 · US-Q-0105✓ substring-verified
“The U.S. negative net international investment position (NIIP) is also expected to continue widening due to nonresident inflows into U.S. risk assets and increased external borrowing by the general government.”
International Monetary Fund — United States: Article IV Consultation — Staff Report, p.7 · vintage 2026-04 · US-Q-0102✓ substring-verified
“A substantial fiscal adjustment, accompanied by a range of other policies to raise private saving, will be essential to reduce these vulnerabilities. Action by trading partners, to address distortions that contribute to external imbalances, will also be critical.”
International Monetary Fund — United States: Article IV Consultation — Staff Report, p.7 · vintage 2026-04 · US-Q-0104✓ substring-verified
“The CA deficit is projected to stabilize at about 31⁄2 percent of GDP over the medium term, reflecting a gradual rise of private savings that is expected to modestly offset the expected increases in fiscal dissaving and private investment.”
International Monetary Fund — United States: Article IV Consultation — Staff Report, p.68 · vintage 2026-04 · US-Q-0106✓ substring-verified
“Despite the administration's policy efforts, the U.S. current account deficit is expected to remain large in the coming years (at around 31⁄2-4 percent of GDP).”
International Monetary Fund — United States: Article IV Consultation — Staff Report, p.7 · vintage 2026-04 · US-Q-0101✓ substring-verified
“This worsening of the NIIP, alongside a shift in the nonresident investor base toward nonbank private investors, represents a potentially important source of vulnerability. An abrupt shift in portfolio preferences could lead to a disorderly external rebalancing.”
International Monetary Fund — United States: Article IV Consultation — Staff Report, p.7 · vintage 2026-04 · US-Q-0103✓ substring-verified
“In 2025, the trade deficit is expected to remain at a similar level to 3.1 percent of GDP in 2024, despite large within-year upswings amid tariff hikes. In the first quarter of 2025, the CA deficit surged to 5.9 percent of GDP, mainly driven by the import frontloading ahead of the announced tariff hikes, but subsequently normalized to 2.9 percent of GDP through the rest of the year.”
International Monetary Fund — United States: Article IV Consultation — Staff Report, p.68 · vintage 2026-04 · US-Q-0107✓ substring-verified
Comparison of institutional forecast accuracy by Average error, Mean absolute error (MAE) and Adjusted MAE. Institutions are ranked by Adjusted MAE — the lowest value indicates the strongest predictive power and is highlighted.
| Institution | N | Avg. error (pp) | MAE (pp) | Adj. MAE (pp) | Rank Avg | Rank MAE | Rank Adj. MAE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMFbest · Adj. MAE | 40 | +0.41 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Forecasts made long before the actual data are released are inherently harder than those made shortly before release. The Adjusted MAE therefore takes into account the period of time between the making of each forecast and the release of the actual data, putting institutions that forecast at different horizons on an equal footing. The approach follows Michael K. Andersson, Ted Aranki and André Reslow: “Adjusting for Information Content when Comparing Forecast Performance” (2016) and “Evaluation of the Riksbank’s forecast” (2018).